Militärische Lehren aus dem Ukraine-Krieg

[Quintus Fabius]

Über leichte Infanterie und Drohnen in der Ukraine:

https://mwi.usma.edu/how-ukraines-roving...e-us-army/

https://mwi.usma.edu/will-the-drone-war-...al-drones/

Zur leichten Infanterie (so wie ich sie mir ebenso vorstelle):

Flexibility, coordination, and synchronization between mobile light infantry units are required. Simple and reliable communication is a critical capability to support dispersal and concentration, allowing the roving bands of marauding light infantry to act in a similar manner to German U-boat operations during the Battle of the Atlantic. As land-based wolfpacks, communications enable the dispersal of forces to support survivability and counterreconnaissance while also ensuring the ability to concentrate to exploit identified opportunities before dispersing once again.

Deshalb ist das Mutterschiff-Konzept falsch:

The current composition of armored brigade combat teams and even Stryker brigades lacks the number of infantry dismounts needed to organically conduct the deliberate and sustained roving aspect of the hedgehog defense to the degree effectively demonstrated in Ukraine. The demands placed on their infantry for platform operation and support, and signatures from these vehicles, preclude them from achieving the mobility and survivability that small, hunter-killer, light infantry teams need to operate.

Even Stryker infantry units still emit a large signature limiting their mobility and survivability in the face of an enemy combined arms attack. Such units are better employed in direct support to the strongpoints, while light infantry roam between them or concentrate temporarily as a counterattack or exploitation force. A study to validate the current force structure of US armored formations for methods to increase infantry dismounts in US armored and Stryker formations could yield important insights, and it might also prove effective to return to a cross-organization method of mixing light infantry with Stryker infantry and armor. Optimizing light infantry for this purpose is key. To that end, equipping strictly light infantry forces with platforms like the Infantry Squad Vehicle to enhance mobility holds promise, but even this raises questions. How much is too much, how big is too big, and where should the mobility requirement lie? These are all important discussions. However, the most important factor for this analysis is that light infantry need mobility to conduct this sort of defense.

Und sie benötigt vor allem anderen die Befähigung der INFILTRATION und der MAXIMALEN QUERFELDEINBEWEGLICHKEIT. Beides hängt zudem direkt zusammen. Eine mögliche Antwort auf die genannte Problemstellung ist die Verwendung ziviler Fahrzeuge. Und eine Kampfweise die sich entlang und etwaig etwas über der Grenze des "erlaubten" bewegt.

Mobility, survivability, and lethality are foundations to successful close combat actions and cannot be taken for granted on the future battlefield. Likewise, fighting in the defense on a linear front against an enemy force cannot be assumed in a sustained, high-intensity, large-scale combat operation.

Streifscharen die unbeschränkt zur Infiltration und Exfiltration fähig sind, könnten eine Antwort sein.