Krieg im 21. Jahrhundert

[Quintus Fabius]

Eine recht interessante Abhandlung (gerade für uns, die wir mehr Korps-Stäbe als einsetzbare Divisionen haben) - über die Zukunft des Korps als Ebene in der NATO für die Zukunft:

https://www.rusi.org/sites/default/files...ersion.pdf

Conclusion

THE CORPS ECHELON is likely to be the keystone in future operations between the operational and tactical level of war. This is because tactically relevant effects can now be applied throughout the operational depth of a force, and because MDO require a level of command that would cognitively overload or dangerously bloat divisional headquarters. Moreover, as informational and political factors have an increased shaping effect on tactical activity, these elements must be managed as part of the tactical level, while necessitating senior officers to provide an appropriate interface with civilian counterparts. Higher echelon headquarters are required to ensure an appropriate span of responsibility and not just the span of control of subordinate formations.However, the nature of corps-level warfighting has evolved from the Cold War. The corps is no longer just a command function but a critical warfighting echelon engaged in its own fight. If that fight is under resourced, subordinate echelons will find themselves either running low on supplies or facing adversaries that have not been subjected to shaping, and therefore be at a disadvantage.

This shaping activity is not just critical in warfighting but central to deterrence and to the period of prolonged competition preceding and following combat operations. It is also increasingly necessary in low-intensity expeditionary operations, especially as long-range precision fires and strategic anti-aircraft systems proliferate among sub-peer adversaries.93During the unipolar post-Cold War era, NATO corps headquarters have multiplied, but the corps echelon has been inadequately resourced and insufficiently exercised. Today, states maintain corps headquarters while having insufficient enablers to support divisional operations, which leaves corps to draw on the often inappropriate and incompatible remnants of national capability. The corps level of command has been left to political jockeying and turn-taking at the expense of military effectiveness. With the return of great power competition and a renewed threat from Russia, the lack of a resourced corps echelon in NATO threatens to undermine the Alliance’s central mission of deterrence.

The Future of the NATO CorpsTo conduct its shaping, C2, force protection, sustainment and fighting responsibilities, a credible corps echelon needs more than just a headquarters. Its organic assets should include:

• A signals brigade.
• A fires command, capable of controlling multiple brigades with organic target acquisition radar systems.
• Electronic warfare-, information operations-, psychological operations- and cyber-capable companies.
• An aviation brigade.
• A reconnaissance brigade.
• A military intelligence brigade, including:ÊAn ISR battalion equipped with multi-role long-range unmanned aerial systems and manned and/or unmanned ground surveillance assets.
• A logistics command able to control and support multiple logistics brigades, including:ÊA medical brigade.
• A chemical defence brigade.
• A combat engineer brigade.
• An air defence brigade.
• An infantry brigade with organic mobility for force protection or a military police brigade.
• A civil affairs brigade and political liaison team.
• An air support operations group, with sufficient air support squadrons to support subordinate divisions.
• A space support element.

This is a considerable force package, comparable in scale and complexity to a frontline division. Yet, without it, NATO’s frontline divisions are liable to lack survivability or endurance, becoming less than the sum of their parts. It is therefore essential that the Alliance – in regenerating its conventional deterrence posture – encourages and rewards states for offering capabilities to this echelon. NATO must also prioritise exercises that link this to divisional headquarters. The need for this echelon of capabilities does not alter the requirement for NATO members to ensure there are a credible mass of warfighting divisions. But the Alliance as a whole must judge the value of contributions by the effectiveness of the combined force, rather than on the balance of inputs. Finally, it must be clearly acknowledged that after a brief dalliance with prioritising highly enabled brigades in the Russian Ground Forces, the Russian Federation has concluded that they lack endurance and combat power,94 and has returned to divisional structures for warfighting. Moreover, Russian divisions are supported by a robust higher echelon structure.

Russian Ground Forces conduct regular snap drills that link tactical dispersed drills with the centralised C2 structure, practise operational manoeuvres and are currently well placed to conduct operations at scale.96 Russia is taking their warfighting capability seriously. To maintain conventional deterrence, NATO must do the same. Revitalising the corps echelon would be a powerful signal of intent.