24.05.2022, 23:27
Nach längerer Pause, für welchselbige er sich sogar höchstselbst entschuldigt hat:
JOMINI
https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/15288...nn27cqAAAA
Die Karten sind eigentlich das beste an diesen Beiträgen! Das sonstige ist ja eher schon Gemeingut und allgemein bekannt.
JOMINI
https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/15288...nn27cqAAAA
Zitat:Gesamtkarte:
https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/15288...64/photo/1
1/ Ukrainian TVD, Day 80-88. The past 9 days has seen one of the most fluid periods to date in the Russo-Ukrainian War. The most significant developments have been the surrender of Ukrainian forces in Mariupol & the Russian breakthrough around Popasna.
So weit nichts neues. Viel relevanter ist die erhebliche Abnutzung der ukrainischen Kräfte im Donbass. Andererseits baut die Ukraine aktuell erhebliche strategische Reserven auf. Nun stellt sich die Frage nach dem Wert besagter Reserven. Klassischen Werken über die Strategie zufolge sollte man den Wert strategischer Reserven nicht überschätzen, weil diese nur in einem bestimmten Kontext und Zeitraum nützlich werden, aber weder davor, noch danach wirklich relevant sind.
2/ Weather Outlook. Forecast for the next 10 days will see reduced cloud cover with little inclement weather; favorable conditions for air & artillery strikes as well as ground assaults. Wind speed and direction will reduce the effectiveness of artillery strikes in general.
Spezifischer noch: sie reduzieren die Leistung der russischen Armee stärker als die der ukrainischen Armee, weil letztgenannte viel mehr gelenkte Munition hat.
Karte Kharkiv:
https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/15288...60/photo/1
3/ Kharkiv OD. The Ukrainian counteroffensive has likely stalled due to recent Russian spoiling attacks in the Ternova & Rubizhne area. Russian forces retain a shallow 10km strip of occupied territory on the border within artillery range of Kharkiv
4/ Russia likely intends to maintain a presence west bank of the Siverskyi Donets rather than use the length of the river as natural obstacle Ukrainian forces must cross. With a bridgehead already over the river at Staryi Saltiv, Ukrainian forces can still threaten Vovchansk.
Das wäre jetzt beispielsweise ein Objektpunkt an dem man möglichst bald eine solche strategische Reserve zum Einsatz bringen müsste.
Karte Severodonetsk-Donetsk:
https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/15288...24/photo/1
5/ Severodonetsk-Donetsk OD. Despite continued heavy losses in the Severodonetsk-Donetsk OD, Russian forces have successfully achieved a localized breakthrough in the Popasna area as well as numerous incremental gains along the Izium & Lyman axes & between Horlivka & Donetsk.
Laut Strelkov ist die Operation in diesem Gebiet ein Disaster, obwohl er zugleich einräumt, dass man hier inzwischen intelligenter vorgeht und anfängt aus seinen Fehlern zu lernen. The Russian Way of War: man lässt einfach alles sterben was nicht funktioniert, und was überlebt sind dann evolutionär in reinstem Darwinismus fähigere Truppen......
6/ The Russian MoD allocated a small operational maneuver group (OMG) of its most capable forces to punch through the secondary Popasna defensive line and exploit this breach toward Soladar in the west and Lysychansik to the north, likely with the intent of forming a cauldron.
7/ Russian forces appear to be leveraging the advantage of Luhansk’s dense rail network to keep forward forces adequately supplied. The OMG in Popasna has made better use of combined arms, a doctrinal approach to breaching prepared defenses, and integrating new combat assets.
Karte Zaporizhzhia OD:
https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/15288...56/photo/1
8/ Zaporizhzhia OD. Russian & Ukrainian activity in the Zaporizhzhia OD has increased over the past week. Between Marinka & Vuhledar Russian units launched a series of assaults that captured a few small towns & villages in the Novomykhaillvka area.
9/ Russian MoD reports that it defeated a counterattack by 2x Ukrainian battalion’s between Hulyaipole & Malynivka on 16 May. Ukrainian sources report an increased presence of Russian troops & equipment in Polohy, likely for a renewed push towards Orikhiv.
Das sind diese Entlastungsangriffe gewesen über welche ich hier schon mal berichtet hatte.
10/ Partisan activity remains active and disruptive in Russian occupied areas, particularly Melitopol & Enerhodar. Russian occupation authorities in Melitopol claim guerillas have attacked artillery & air defense systems throughout the region.
Die Guerilla bleibt aber aktuell immer noch weit unter ihren theoretischen Möglichkeiten. Das kommt aber vielleicht noch. Und umgekehrt arbeiten die Russen anscheinend zur Zeit recht gezielt ihre Todeslisten ab, verschleppen Leute und sind mit Folter und Vernehmungen recht erfolgreich.
Karte Azovstal:
https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/15288...64/photo/1
11/ Azovstal. After 86 days of resistance, Ukrainian forces surrendered to Russian forces in the Azovstal Steel Plant on orders of the Ukrainian Government. Although these troops are meant to be part of a prisoner exchange it is unclear is Russia will honor that commitment.
Meiner Meinung nach (reine Vermutung!) hat die ukrainische Regierung die Situation dort absichtlich herbei geführt und die Truppen dort intentional untergehen lassen. Dazu muss man wissen, dass Zelensky und die dort kämpfenden Einheiten von Azow eine ziemlich negative Beziehung zueinander hatten und haben.
Karte Odeassa / Kherson:
https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/15288...13/photo/1
12/ Odesa-Kherson OD. There has been little combat activity in the Kherson-Odesa OD over the past week. Ukrainian & Russian efforts have mostly focused on improving their tactical positioning. Russian authorities continue to solidify control over the population of Kherson Oblast.
Karte Schwarzes Meer:
https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/15288...72/photo/1
13/ Black Sea OTMO. The Russian blockade of Odesa continues. The Black Seas Fleet remains active in the western Black Sea to interdict shipping in and out of Odesa, as well as conduct cruise missile strikes against critical Ukrainian infrastructure throughout Ukraine.
14/ Aerospace Assessment. VKS sorties are averaging 250 for a 24-hrs period. Close air support of units operating the Donbas has substantially increased, particularly in the Lyman area. Recent VKS losses include 2x fighter jets (unknown type), 2x helicopters, & 12x UAVs.
Die Zahl der täglichen Einsätze ist derart konstant, dass es wirklich überraschend ist.
15/ Battle Damage Assessment. Anecdotal reporting and generalized statements by Ukrainian/Russian officials of combat losses along the Izium-Lyman-Severdonetsk-Popasna line of operation state a high rate of losses in both troops & equipment among Russian & Ukrainian forces.
16/ Ukrainian TV, Day 80-88. Russia is attempting to place intense pressure on Africa and those parts of Asia that depend on Ukrainian Wheat exports in a likely attempt to force the restart of negotiations. Italy has introduced a 4-point plan to the UN for an end to hostilities.
17/ Humanitarian Impact. Ukrainian refugees total 8.95+ million with 6.79+ million in countries bordering Ukraine, another 2.146+ throughout Europe. Internally displaced people throughout Ukraine remains at 7.6+ million (1.4+ million in east & 519K in south Ukraine).
18/ Info War. Russian authorities & media have been using the surrender of Azovstal to claim the defenders of Mariupol as “fascists” who should be tried for war crimes. This narrative was present during the CSTO meeting to try & illicit military support from its member states.
19/ Information Advantage. The address of Polish President Andrzej Duda during his visit to Kyiv supporting Ukraine’s war aim to liberate all its territory from Russian occupation has wide public support in Western nations, counter to recent suggestion to negotiate a ceasefire.
20/ Overall Assessment. Russia’s push against Severodonetsk will likely determine the success or failure of this current phase of the war. Russian failure to secure the borders of Luhansk & at least make a meaningful advance into Donetsk risks not achieving the Kremlin’s aims.
Wenn dieses offizielle Minimalziel nicht erreicht wird, ist eine Eskalation nicht mehr zu verhindern.
21/ As stated previously, the breakthrough at Popasna has been the result of a better application of doctrinal methodologies and the integration of new combat assets (like BMPT AFV) that has allowed Russian forces to maneuver more effectively and outflank Ukrainian defenses.
22/ Likewise, supporting this has been a missing element of Russian offensive capability, effective supply of sustained combat operations. The Popasna OMG has remained effective largely in part because it has been better supplied than previous Russian offensives.
Zum Verständnis: dort gibt es gleich mehrere Eisenbahnlinien. Während beispielsweise entlang der Operationslinie in Richtung Kiew bei Kriegsbeginn keine Eisenbahnlinien verlaufen sind. Die russische Logistik ist daher überall recht gut, wo es genug Eisenbahnstrecken gibt.
23/ However, the stability of the Russian breakout from Popasna depends on the long-term coherence of this OMGs logistic sustainment. Otherwise it will be unable to make gains for much longer, let alone create a cauldron in Severodonetsk that forces Ukraine forces to withdraw.
Die Karten sind eigentlich das beste an diesen Beiträgen! Das sonstige ist ja eher schon Gemeingut und allgemein bekannt.