Russland vs. Ukraine

[Quintus Fabius]

Und noch MickRyan, der ebenso wie viele im Forum eine deutliche Eskalation als Plan C der Russen befürchtet:

https://twitter.com/WarintheFuture/statu...zWh-ApAAAA

3/25 Russia has not achieved its key military objectives in the north, east of south. It has committed all the military forces it had for Ukraine on these missions. As I noted two days ago, the Russian campaign, if it has not already, is about to culminate.

4/25 With the strain on the Russian forces (and their slovenly plans) showing, the Russian high command has gone back to drawing board (again) with their campaign design. We are now seeing Russia’s ‘Plan C’ campaign in Ukraine.

5/25 Plan C can be described as: hold current gains, long range firepower on cities, foreign fighters as cannon fodder, destroy as much infrastructure & manufacturing as possible, expand the war to the west to deter foreign volunteers & aid providers.

6/25 The new Russian campaign also seems to have a punitive, almost medieval, aspect to it. The Russians appear to be punishing the Ukrainian people for daring to stand against the Russian bear, while hoping they capitulate. ‘Hope’ is a bad course of action in war.

Karte Kiew:

https://twitter.com/WarintheFuture/statu...54/photo/1

7/25 A key part on Russia’s ‘Plan C’ appears to be the Russian encirclement and capture of Kyiv. On 6 March, I explored how Russia might capture Kyiv. In the 11 days since, the Russians have slowly, inexorably closed on the Ukrainian capital but at very high cost.

8/25 Why does Kyiv matter? The capture of Kyiv is the main effort for the Russian military campaign in Ukraine. Russian possession of Kyiv is essential for Putin’s desired political end state for the war – Ukrainian subservience.

9/25 Kyiv’s importance to the Ukrainians has only grown as the war has progressed. It remains the centre of Ukraine’s democratic government. It is from here that President Zelensky leads his nation – and shapes world opinion about the war.

10/25 Holding Kyiv also provides a major psychological boost for Ukraine’s soldiers and civilians. So, to the Russian President, the capture of Kyiv is essential to ‘his’ defeat of Ukraine.

11/25 What might be the key features of any battle for control of Kyiv? First, the Russians are severely short in personnel. They can’t take the whole city. They will focus only on key nodes & parts of the city where Ukrainian politicians, government officials & military HQ are.

12/25 Second, urban operations are significantly more expensive in human life than combat operations in other environments. We will see a spike in casualties – both civilian and military. It will be a large spike.

13/25 Third, perhaps because of the high threat posed by urban operations, we may see more autonomous systems on the ground, and in the air, to reduce risk to human combatants. It is one thing I expected to see more of in this war.

Ebenso!

14/25 Fourth, we can’t visualise this as a single massive battle. It won’t be. It will be thousands of micro-battles between different combatants in streets, buildings, rubble, tunnels, towers, in the air & info domain. This will be very difficult for either side to control.

15/25 Fifth, this lack of control, combined with limited visibility and the brutalisation of soldiers that occurs in this kind of combat, means that the potential for war crimes is significantly increased in any fight for Kyiv.

16/25 Sixth, both sides will need to fight in combined arms teams that are well lead and logistically supported. This means tanks, accompanied by infantry, logistics, UAVs, repair and recovery assets, and many, many combat engineers.

17/25 And if they are smart (which there has not been a lot of evidence for on the Russian side in this war), lots and lots of armoured bulldozers. We know for sure the Russians have them.

18/25 Finally, airpower and air defence, are important. Currently, the Ukrainians are holding their own in the air fight. As for the Russians, I don’t think the head of the Russian Army will be sending a Christmas card to the Russian Air Force this year.

9/25 However, this remains a hypothetical for now. There have been many predictions of ‘imminent’ Russian assaults against the capital. But as @danlamothe
notes in his latest Pentagon update, the Russians remain bogged down on Kyiv’s eastern & north-western approaches.

20/25 What are Russia’s chances of a successful seizure of Kyiv? My assessment is ‘low’. Urban operations are much more complex to plan and execute than other conventional operations. And the Russians have not shown high competence in their normal ops.

21/25 The rough rule for urban attacks (not COIN) is about 3-5 attackers for each defender. Given the number of Ukrainian defenders & complexity of the defences, the Russians will need tens of thousands of soldiers to attempt an attack into Kyiv. Tens of thousands.

22/25 And in the information battle, an assault on Kyiv will only see things get worse for the Russians. The world will focus on Kyiv as the decisive fight of the war. And most of the world will be seeking – and supporting - a Ukrainian victory.

23/25 So any Russian attack on Kyiv will be very costly for soldiers (especially infantry, armour and commanders) and civilians. It will also be enormously destructive with a huge post-war financial impact.

24/25 As @LawDavf
makes clear in his latest (and quite superb) analysis of the war and its financial impact on Russia, the economic costs of the Battle for Kyiv will be extraordinarily high.

25/25 If the Russians were to attack into Kyiv (not just missile attacks) it would be drawn-out battle that will last weeks, possibly months. Given the military disaster this campaign has already been for Russia, things could get much worse for them in Kyiv. End.

Meine Schlussfolgerung aus dem Status Quo ist, dass man gar nicht erst versuchen wird Kiew zu stürmen, stattdessen wird man es belagern und "aushungern". Das geht gegen eine moderne Stadt wesentlich schneller als viele es annehmen.