Elektronische Kriegsführung und Cyberwarfare
https://twitter.com/lancer_brigade/statu...56/photo/1

Zitat:Tactical Electronica Warfare System enable to commander to locate the enemy and deny or disrupt their ability to communicate and synchronize.
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EloKa für die Infanterie:

https://ndiastorage.blob.core.usgovcloud...E_JTWS.pdf

https://www.thedrive.com/content-b/messa...quality=60

https://soldiersystems.net/2017/07/18/us...n-sensors/

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/40...nce-system

A 2019 briefing from U.S. Special Operations Command's (SOCOM) JTWS Program Manager said that this system was capable of providing very-high-frequency/ultra-high-frequency (VHF/UHF) direction-finding capability. Other sources make clear that even the backpack elements of the JTWS family have some level of geolocation and communications intercept capabilities. This means that they can both determine the source of a radiofrequency emission and, if it's a certain type of unencrypted radio or other communications chatter, listen in on it.
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https://mwi.usma.edu/full-spectrum/

https://mwi.usma.edu/our-digital-vulnera...-next-war/

Zitat:Recognizing the digital interconnectedness of the world and the resulting vulnerabilities is critical for building resilient and flexible responses to attacks on critical infrastructure and systems. Recent actions by the United States government have begun the process of further securing critical infrastructure. The Biden administration’s executive order on improving US cybersecurity has provided initial guidance on how the federal government should develop an integrated response and incident prevention network. However, the authority of the United States government is limited because the majority of what influences and affects the American population exists in the private sector, outside the government’s direct control.

Moving from the macro to the individual, in 2020, 85 percent of Americans reported owning a smartphone. These computers in our pockets provide immense value in our daily lives; at the same time, they supply insight and access to individuals that were previously unavailable—insight and access also available to malign actors and marketing firms. Personal data availability, combined with the collection of both open-source information and stolen and purchased data sets, enables the creation of enormous social network diagrams and provides possible connections that can be exploited by nefarious actors. Countering any self-collected human and open-source intelligence will require examining and discussing techniques for mitigating the digital breadcrumbs we all leave behind as we go about our daily lives.

Unfortunately, good digital hygiene and the absence of digital signatures can also betray sensitive information—Matt, in the above scenario, and his wife and colleagues turned off and left their smartphones outside their workspaces, indicating the presence of a secure facility of intelligence value to foreign adversaries. Therefore, organizations need thoughtful and ongoing exposure risk mitigation plans that acknowledge the spectrum of ways that digital signatures can impact operations.

In addition to smartphones providing a window into our pattern of life, connected devices also create digital access points to interact with our environment directly. Touchless payments, near-field communication, and poorly secured or unsecured internet-of-things devices are all access points into our physical world. There are simple ways to isolate the digital world from our physical world—RFID-blocker card sleeves being an example—but the public must be both motivated to adopt security measures and willing to be an active participant. Without an understanding of the vulnerabilities that exist and knowledge of the readily available solutions to mitigate exposure risk, the public remains blissfully unaware of how a simple link-click can open personal records to foreign agents and cybercriminals. Education, starting as early as elementary school, should include technology orientation and the steps to securing digital information to mitigate the risk of exploitation.

Meiner Meinung nach lautet das militärische Stichwort für die Zukunft in Wahrheit Ent-Digitalisierung.
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Eine ganze Reihe von extrem leichten und hochmobilen EloKa Systemen (speziell für die Infanterie hochinteressant), welche die Möglichkeit bieten EloKa Fähigkeiten auf immer niedrigerer Ebene einzusetzen. Entsprechende LEKE Züge sollten eigentlich in jedem Bataillon vorhanden sein:

https://www.intercept.ws/catalog/4542.html

https://mctech-jammers.com/products/mc-4-8-ra/

https://www.chemring.com/~/media/Files/C...esolve.pdf

Und hier noch zwei weitere Vernetzungen zu Wirkmitteln der elektronischen Kriegsführung:

https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/doc...ornuta.htm

Besonders interessant fand ich das folgende Mittel, auch wegen seiner Verbindung zur Gripen:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BriteCloud
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https://mwi.usma.edu/imposing-costs-unco...vironment/

Zitat:This article examines UW from the perspective of great power competition and the current state of persistent engagement with one of our near-peer competitors, Russia. Today’s perpetual competition is the manifestation of great power competition as defined in the 2017 National Security Strategy and revisited in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance released in 2021. Specifically, this article investigates Russian integrated operations in the information environment (OIE) and cyber domain as a form of continuous competition that falls below the threshold of open armed conflict. We assess Russia’s OIE effects and capabilities, our understanding of Russian OIE, and potential responses to Russian aggression.
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LEKE beim USMC

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FyOPforS...=emb_title
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Seltene russische EloKa-Flugzeuge über dem Baltikum:

https://theaviationist.com/2021/07/30/il...ssion=true

Zitat:NATO Fighters Intercepted Two Rare Russian Il-22PP ‘Mute’ EW Aircraft Over The Baltics For The Very First Time

Some pretty interesting close encounters between NATO fighters supporting BAP (Baltic Air Policing) mission and Russian aircraft flying in international airspace close to the airspace of the Baltic States took place on Jul. 29, 2021: overall, two Il-22PP “Mute” Electronic Warfare Aircraft, one Su-24 Fencer and an Il-76 Candid transport were tracked, intercepted and identified in the same area as they were on their way to Russia from Kaliningrad Oblast.

According to NATO, NATO’s Combined Air Operations Centre at Uedem in Germany launched the allied fighter aircraft to intercept and identify them. The Russian aircraft did not have flight plans nor transmit transponder codes, and thus posed a potential risk to civilian flights.

The intercept mission was carried out by Spanish Air Force Eurofighters and Italian Air Force F-35s, both on QRA (Quick Reaction Alert) duty in the Baltic region.

Noteworthy, it was the very first time NATO intercepted the Il-22PP Porubshchik (NATO designation “Mute”) in that region. The “electronic escort” aircraft made its first appearance in 2017, during the celebrations of the 105th anniversary of the Russian air force over Kubinka. According to Piotr Butowski, the aircraft is a SIGINT (Signal Intelligence) and stand-off jamming platform, based on a converted Il-22 “Coot-B” aircraft (a command post and radio relay aircraft based on the Il-18D airliner).
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Und noch zwei Beiträge der Warzone zur EloKa:

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/41...-in-flight

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/41...ctually-do

Im übrigen bin ich der Meinung dass wir einen Eurofighter ECR benötigen, hier und jetzt sofort (sollte ich vielleicht zu meiner allgemeinen Signatur machen)
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Drei Artikel zur Cyberkriegsführung:

Cyberwar mit Russland:

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/na...losing-and

Cyberwar mit China und die Entwicklung der entsprechenden Fähigkeiten in der VR:

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/ev...ber-threat

Der Krieg um die besser entwickelten Microchips:

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/ba...microchips
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Auf der taktischen Ebene:

https://mwi.usma.edu/digital-irregular-w...cal-level/
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Fighting and Winning in the Electromagnetic Spectrum

https://warontherocks.com/2022/12/fighti...-spectrum/
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Ein recht imposantes Fahrzeug, auch wenn ich die Leistungsfähigkeit nicht genau einschätzen kann...
Zitat:Czech Army unveils new indigenous STARKOM tactical communication jammer

Janes has learnt details of the STAvebnicový Rušič KOMunikační (Modular Communication Jammer: STARKOM), one of the main components of a mobile electronic warfare (EW) system. The first STARKOM system was delivered to the Czech Army's 53rd Reconnaissance and Electronic Warfare Regiment in mid-October.

The system was developed and manufactured entirely in the Czech Republic in only three years. The main contractor is the state-owned VVU Brno military research institute, with the software (SW) and key hardware components related to EW provided by specialised Czech jamming systems manufacturer URC Systems, supported by systems engineering company JISR Institute.
https://www.janes.com/defence-news/c4isr...ion-jammer

Schneemann
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Eine neue elegante Worthülse die ich so noch nicht auf dem Schirm hatte:

Kognitive elektronische Kriegsführung:

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/f-...ic-warfare

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9X99k09rVUI

Zitat:Altogether, any future high-end battlefield is all but certain to be full of various tiers of electronic warfare systems on all sides.

U.S. Air Force F-35 units have clearly already been learning new valuable lessons about electronic warfare issues that are likely to arise in future battlespaces from patrols along NATO's eastern flank over the past year or so. This all only reinforces the case for developing and fielding cognitive electronic warfare capabilities to address new threats or other unexpected circumstances that might emerge suddenly. While the F-35's ability to detect and flag the curious emission was critical, being able to deploy code to counter it not in a matter of days or even hours, but in near real-time potentially right onboard the same aircraft, and distributing across the battlespace, could be a game changer in battles to come.
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(06.03.2024, 18:54)Helios schrieb: Es ist halt alles relativ, völlig Abhörsicherheit gibt es nicht, umgekehrt sorgen mehrere Schichten dafür, dass es in vielen Fällen sehr kompliziert bis quasi unmöglich wird, selbst wenn es irgendwo offene Einfallstore gibt. Das Problem beim Hotel-WLAN besteht ja beispielsweise nicht primär darin, dass ein beispielsweise per VPN genutzter Ende-zu-Ende-verschlüsselter Messenger direkt mitgehört wird, sondern dass etwa durch eine andere Schwachstelle der Zugriff auf das Endgerät erfolgen kann. Für die Mobilfunk-Datenverbindung gilt letztlich das gleiche.

Das Ding ist in dem Fall der verschlüsselten Nachrichten allerdings das die gerne mitgelesen werden können, die Entschlüsselung findet erst auf dem Endgerät statt. So lange die nur Kauderwelsch lesen ist es also vollkommen egal. So sollte es auch bei den Audios sein. Naja gut mittlerweile hat man ja herausgefunden was das Problem war.
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(06.03.2024, 21:54)Jason77 schrieb: nervt allerdings etwas mit seinen Kommentaren…

Ich habe da nur kurz reingehört, ein gutes Beispiel für mangelnde Medienkompetenz. Wink

(06.03.2024, 23:10)Galileo schrieb: Das Ding ist in dem Fall der verschlüsselten Nachrichten allerdings das die gerne mitgelesen werden können, die Entschlüsselung findet erst auf dem Endgerät statt.

Genau das habe ich gesagt (oder damit sagen wollen). Wink Aus dem Grund ist auch weniger das Problem, was man in offenen Netzen macht, als vielmehr, welche Angriffsmöglichkeiten sich durch diese auf die Geräte bieten, die dann wiederum Angriffe auf die Kommunikation ermöglichen. Per unverschlüsselter Telefonverbindung in eine verschlüsselte Konferenz einwählen ist da eine andere Ebene.
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