02.08.2006, 15:29
@Schneemann
Lies dir mal den Post von Ingenieur vom 01.08.2006, 19:51 Uhr durch. Vielleicht fällt Dir dann etwas auf
@Topic
Es wird ja oft gesagt, man sei so überrascht gewesen, als angeblich eine iranische Exilorganisation das iranische Anreicherungsprogramm aufgedeckt hat. Diese vermeintliche Tatsache wird immer als Argument vorgeschoben, wie sehr der Iran die Internationale Gemeinschaft an der Nase herumgeführt hat und wie arg man darüber doch schockiert sei.
Im folgenden kann ich belegen, dass die IAEA schon lange von den iransichen Aktivitäten gewusst hat, oder zumindest gewusst haben muss. Gleiches gilt selbstverständlich für die Geheimdienste.
1989-1990(IAEA)
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<!-- m --><a class="postlink" href="http://www.iranwatch.org/international/IAEA/iaea-technical">http://www.iranwatch.org/international/ ... -technical</a><!-- m --> cooperation-1990.pdf
<!-- m --><a class="postlink" href="http://www.iranwatch.org/international/IAEA/iaea-projectschedule-199192.pdf">http://www.iranwatch.org/international/ ... 199192.pdf</a><!-- m -->
<!-- m --><a class="postlink" href="http://www.iranwatch.org/international/IAEA/iaea-projectschedule-199394.pdf">http://www.iranwatch.org/international/ ... 199394.pdf</a><!-- m -->
<!-- m --><a class="postlink" href="http://www10.antenna.nl/wise/index.html?http://www10.antenna.nl/wise/502/4948.html">http://www10.antenna.nl/wise/index.html ... /4948.html</a><!-- m -->
Lies dir mal den Post von Ingenieur vom 01.08.2006, 19:51 Uhr durch. Vielleicht fällt Dir dann etwas auf

@Topic
Es wird ja oft gesagt, man sei so überrascht gewesen, als angeblich eine iranische Exilorganisation das iranische Anreicherungsprogramm aufgedeckt hat. Diese vermeintliche Tatsache wird immer als Argument vorgeschoben, wie sehr der Iran die Internationale Gemeinschaft an der Nase herumgeführt hat und wie arg man darüber doch schockiert sei.
Im folgenden kann ich belegen, dass die IAEA schon lange von den iransichen Aktivitäten gewusst hat, oder zumindest gewusst haben muss. Gleiches gilt selbstverständlich für die Geheimdienste.
1989-1990(IAEA)
Zitat:The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran wishes to assess geophysical data related to uranium exploration in the country. The information is already stored on magnetic tapes but needs to be evaluated.1990 (IAEA)
...
It is expected that the project will strengthen the Atomic Energy Organization's capabilities in uranium exploration and processing, and in evaluating the uranium exploration data. In the long term, it should lead to improved assessment of the economic potential of uranium mining.
...
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<!-- m --><a class="postlink" href="http://www.iranwatch.org/international/IAEA/iaea-technical">http://www.iranwatch.org/international/ ... -technical</a><!-- m --> cooperation-1990.pdf
Zitat:The IAEA's Tehnical Cooperation Activities in 1990 - Iran1991-92 (IAEA)
...
A high priority is being given to the nuclear power programme: the construction of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant had had to be suspended, but it is intended to redevelop the
infrastructure and re-start construction. Priority is also being given to identifying
economically favourable uranium resources to be used in support of the nuclear
power programme.
...
225. The Government also foresees exploitation of national uranium resources; the
country is among the few in the world with a relatively strong exploration programme.
About 40% of its territory has been surveyed by airborne gamma-ray spectrometry
since 1974. Follow-up work on favourability has led to the discovery of some
interesting uranium deposits, several of which are associated with polymetallic sul-
phide mineralizations. The Agency has been providing technical assistance since
1985 under a long-term project on the processing of the airborne data, preparation of
maps and interpretation of the geology. Support is expected to continue for a
comprehensive exploration programme which should lead, after evaluation, to a
feasibility study on the mining and processing of uranium ores. To prepare the
infrastructure and introduce the technology, a supplementary project was approved
from 1991 on ore dressing and leaching of uranium ores, with the objectives of setting
up a properly equipped dressing laboratory and determining the feed and leaching
parameters that permit optimum uranium recovery . In addition, in a project approved
for 1992, advice will be provided on effluent treatment and on the design of the liquid
waste treatment and tailing disposal systems for safe operation of the pilot uranium
ore processing plant.
...
<!-- m --><a class="postlink" href="http://www.iranwatch.org/international/IAEA/iaea-projectschedule-199192.pdf">http://www.iranwatch.org/international/ ... 199192.pdf</a><!-- m -->
Zitat:TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION1993-94 (IAEA)
PROJECT SCHEDULES FOR 1991-92
...
LONG-TERM IMPACT: It is expected that the project will result in a long-term programme of systematic training of local specialists needed for nuclear activities in Iran.
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LONG-TERM IMPACT: It is expected that the project will result in the transfer of knowledge on a comprehensive uranium exploration programme, the training of local specialists and the assessment of uranium resources in Iran.
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LONG-TERM IMPACT: The project will result in the transfer of knowledge on ore dressing and leaching of uranium ores excavated in Iran and in the setting-up of an ore dressing laboratory.
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NATIONAL INPUT: Fresh low-enriched fuel has been purchased from Argentina and the reactor is undergoing a core conversion. The necessary staff and a budget in local currency are available.
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LONG-TERM IMPACT: It is envisaged that the Agency support will contribute to the safe repair and rehabilitation of the damaged structure and components of the Bushehr nuclear power plant as well as to development of the infrastructure and national capabilities.
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LONG-TERM IMPACT: It is expected that the project will result in an operational incinerator and its use in the nuclear power plant programme for radioactive waste treatment.
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LONG-TERM I MPACT: It is expected that the project will help ensure the safe handling of the radioactive wastes from uranium mining and milling in Iran.
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<!-- m --><a class="postlink" href="http://www.iranwatch.org/international/IAEA/iaea-projectschedule-199394.pdf">http://www.iranwatch.org/international/ ... 199394.pdf</a><!-- m -->
Zitat:TECHNICAL CO-OPERATIONArtikel von wise auf dem Jahr 1998:
PROJECT SCHEDULES FOR 1993-94
LONG-TERM IMPACT: This project will ensure that a suitable range of training and manpower
development can occur within the broad scope of Agency programmes. The result will be a significant enhancement of the scientific and technical capacity of the country.
...
LONG-TERM IMPACT: It is expected that the project will result in the assessment of uranium
resources in Iran and in the introduction of a comprehensive uranium exploration programme.
...
LONG-TERM IMPACT: It is expected that the project will result in a fully functioning cyclotron
laboratory for training and radioisotope production purposes.
...
LONG-TERM IMPACT: The project will significantly contribute to the development of an adequate infrastructure for the nuclear power programme in Iran.
...
<!-- m --><a class="postlink" href="http://www10.antenna.nl/wise/index.html?http://www10.antenna.nl/wise/502/4948.html">http://www10.antenna.nl/wise/index.html ... /4948.html</a><!-- m -->
Zitat:Iran: Stepping up laser-enrichment program, cooperation with EU?In den Analysen ist zwar nicht ausdrücklich von urananreicherung die Rede, aber mit ein bischen Sachverstand (den ich der IAEA und den Geheimdiensten eigentlich zutraue) müsste man aus den vorliegenden Informationen eindeutig schliessen können, dass der Iran an verschiedenen Methoden arbeitet, den Brensstoffkreislauf komplett im eigenen Land durchzuführen. Wer sich also nicht mit beiden Händen die Augen zugehalten hat, hätte aus den intensiven Bestrebungen Hinsichtlich des Abbaus von Uran, den Arbeiten an diversen Forschungsreaktoren und der Rekonstruktion des Reaktors in Bushehr schliessen können -nein müssen!-, was Sache ist.
Western intelligence agencies believe that Iran is trying to procure Western laser equipment and technology for its secret uranium- enrichment program. Laser enrichment has been under development for over 30 years now, and it is advanced enough to be of interest for countries seeking to make nuclear weapons. The EU is looking for closer cooperation with Iran.
(502.4948) WISE Amsterdam - Iran's interest in laser-enrichment started under the Shah in the late 1970s, based on imported lasers from the US. After the 1991 Gulf War, Iran was suspected to be involved in similar clandestine nuclear weapons research as Iraq. Officials from the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) denied it had any enrichment research.
But according to the US CIA and the German BND, the AEOI is doing laser-enrichment research and that the Iranian procurement firms are trying to buy foreign laser equipment. The AEOI is working on both Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (AVLIS) and Molecular Laser Isotope Separation (MLIS) methods as well as on centrifuge enrichment.
The laser research and development (R&D) is centered at the Laser Research Center (LRC) in Teheran, which is part of the Teheran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC). Now Iran produces its own laser crystals which could be operated in the blue-green spectrum, which is the wavelength to enrich uranium using AVLIS. The LRC is headed by the Iranian scientist Dr. Seddiqi. Both LRC and TNRC are cooperating with the Sharif University of Teheran. This university is also doing other enrichment research, including centrifuge development. Iran is expected to sign the IAEA Part II protocol for reformed safeguards and has then to declare all its nuclear activities and sites to the IAEA, also in the area of laser enrichment. IAEA officials visited the Sharif University several times but failed to find any clues that it is engaged in clandestine nuclear activities. To make progress in laser enrichment, Iran must rely on clandestine imports. In 1992, the LRC tried to import modern laser systems. It is not known where Iran got centrifuge equipment and know-how.
Recently the German government warned key laser equipment producers that AEOI and Iranian procurement firms would seek to buy equipment to develop its laser R&D further.
...