Krieg im 21. Jahrhundert

[Quintus Fabius]

Buchempfehlung:

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-researc...st-century

https://www.amazon.de/Arms-Future-Techno...1350352950

https://wavellroom.com/2023/12/27/wavell...he-future/

The core argument

Each third of “The Arms of the Future” sequentially builds off its predecessor section, culminating in a series of broad reflections. The first outlines how emerging technologies are affecting and will affect battlefield operations and geometry. Here, Watling focuses on the challenges of operating in a transparent battlefield (rear areas are increasingly vulnerable), the fight for spectrum and electronic dominance (it is not just about more bandwidth), the future of armored vehicles (the tank may not be dead, but it needs to go on a diet in terms of armor and main armament), the need to increase the protection of supporting functions (due to dispersal), and the importance of urban domains. Each chapter elucidates how the battlefield is changing and how militaries need to adapt to these changes in a very measured manner.

The second third argues first that the fundamental geography and geometry of the battlefield requires reconsideration as a result of the changes outlined in the first section. Whereas armies could enjoy protected areas in the rear, long range precision fires and the transparency of the battlefield challenge these assumptions as illustrated by Ukraine’s successful attacks against Russian staging grounds. The necessary dispersal of forces in response necessitates the devolution of capabilities such as medical and engineering, which in turn requires those functions’ “up armoring”. This is especially true as small, dismounted and mounted recce units bring significant direct and indirect fire against support and logistics units. The traditional push-pull approach to logistics and supply distribution is upended if your adversary can strike your supply chains or any concentration of forces.

With this in mind, Watling then sketches a well-thought-out force structure design that aims to shift land forces away from a mechanized basis and more towards an “informatized” foundation. Centered on maneuver, fires, assault, and support functions, Watling explores how the preceding technologies should shape the development specialist functions. He argues that while generalist forces are suitable for peacetime maintenance, in conflict focused forces are of far greater value.

The level of detail and granularity may pose a challenge for readers not as au fait with formations, capabilities, and functions, yet the detail is crucial—Watling is building tactical units from the ground-up to respond to emerging military dynamics and technological innovation. This approach, as opposed to a top-down force design, better reflects the challenge of operating in this new increasingly contested environment.

The final third then reflects on how this force structure fits into the broader concept of operations. He swiftly—in one chapter—explores the implications of the changing battlefield considerations and force design with other domains such as space, cyber, air, and maritime. Here, he argues that the intersection of land forces with these components occurs at different echelons that will, in turn, see a divergence of mission and priorities in high intensity conflict. It is certainly vital to talk about jointness and integration, but when and if the metaphorical balloon goes up, different domains will have different demands and foci.

He quite rightly, in the third section of the book, identifies a key challenge—the transformation of existing force structures to meet current and future trends. Whereas he enjoyed the advantage of a tabula rasa for his force design, Western militaries are not starting from a clean slate. Balancing legacy systems with urgent adaptation and long-term planning and development is difficult in ideal circumstances and is exceedingly painful when politics enters into the equation e.g. the U.S. Marine Corps Force Design 2030.

Watling sensibly steers clear of trying to boil the ocean, instead outlining five key areas of prioritized reform: networks, shooters, sensors, urban training, and layered defense—each of which are vital to his case for technologically-driven force transformation. This is strategic and operational necessity if the West is to prepare for the future. Indeed, in my conversations with NATO representatives earlier this autumn, this was a recognized challenge—augmenting or adapting the current force design and structure in response to lessons from Ukraine whilst balancing the long-term challenges of planning for the future.