(Amerika) United States Air Force (USAF)

[Aegrotare]

Ein sehr lesenswerte und ernüchterndes Paper über den Zustand der US Airforce, insbesondere im Vergleich zu den Chinesen.
WINNING THE NEXT WAR: OVERCOMING THE U.S. AIR FORCE’S CAPACITY, CAPABILITY, AND READINESS CRISIS
John Venable with Joshua Baker

Abstract
The Air Force’s commitment to generating a highly lethal force that is technologically superior, numerically
sufficient, and flown by the most well-trained airmen in the world is the bedrock of deterring aggression
in times of peace and prevailing in war. Projecting joint military power demands a robust level of airpower
that only the Air Force can provide. Yet today’s United States Air Force is the oldest, smallest, and least
ready in its history. Facing the severely challenging global threat environment for the next decade and
beyond, these shortfalls set the conditions for an existential national security crisis. Moreover, projected
underfunding of the Air Force within the future years defense plan (FYDP) will exacerbate the service’s
decline. The service’s FY 2025 budget request sought to divest 250 aircraft, while only procuring 91. The
FY 2026 request seeks to divest 340 aircraft, while only acquiring 76.1 Anemic funding for operations and
maintenance will only advance the downward trajectory of force readiness, taking already historic lows to
levels once thought unfathomable.2 It is essential that the Trump administration and Congress reverse the
service’s decline in capacity, capability, and readiness.
The solution demands increasing the Air Force budget, while also shifting internal service funds from
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) into both procurement and operations and
maintenance (O&M) accounts specifically aimed at re-establishing readiness to prevail in peer conflict.
The Air Force’s innovative capabilities are only relevant if procured in operationally significant quantities
and flown by an exceptionally well-trained force. If the declines in the U.S. Air Force are excused or
ignored, the human and material losses we will suffer in the next major conflict risk being significant.
Defeat is a very real possibility. That is a price the nation cannot afford.

Conclusion
It is more than obvious that the USAF needs a significant increase in its total obligation authority. The capacity,
capability, and readiness levels of the U.S. Air Force are at the lowest point in its history—well below even the
hollow-force days of the Carter administration in late 1970s. In 2016, just four of 32 fighter squadrons could
execute all or even most of the missions those units were tasked to support through their respective designed
operational capability statements. Today, it is unlikely that a single squadron can execute all or most of their
tasked DOC missions. Mission capability rates remain poor, and pilots receive just enough sorties to have a
minimum level of employability. While these sorties allow them to be labeled as having basic mission-capable
levels of competency, they no longer have the reflexes, habit patterns, or judgement required for a peer fight.
Meanwhile, PLAAF capacity and readiness levels already exceed those of the USAF, and it is increasing both
at rates that will place U.S. airmen in an untenable position for a confrontation with China. Their fighter
pilots are flying half-again as much as USAF pilots, and the PLAAF will acquire 120 5th-generation J-20s this
year, almost three times the 42 F-35s the Air Force is programmed to acquire in FY 2025.176 Dropping the
F-35 buy to 24, as the FY 2026 buy requests, is wholly unacceptable. In fact, in FY 2026, the Air Force, driven
by budget pressures, seeks to divest 260 fighters and only procure 45. That death spiral math is no longer
acceptable given the small size of the current inventory and the realities of the threat environment. The Trump
administration and Congress must recognize and address this growing capability disparity immediately.
With a congressional plus-up of just $5.1 billion in FY 2027, $15.4 billion in FY 2028, and a total of $19.5
billion in FY 2029 and the years beyond, the service can ramp up to procure 72 F-35s, 21 B-21s, 360
LRASMs, and 750 JASSMs, and it can sustain 462 AIM-120Ds a year by FY 2029. Programs like E-7
must also be protected, and MQ-9 inventories must be sustained. CCA represents an important investment
in future capabilities and necessary capacity. Even without additional congressional funding today, senior
Air Force leaders have options they should consider to begin to turn the corner on readiness and capacity: move funding from RDT&E to increase flying hours and WSS by 10 percent; increase procurement of the
F-35 from 42 to 54 jets a year; increase procurement of the B-21; increase procurement of LRASMs from
115 to 190 missiles a year; and increase JASSM procurement from 550 to 650 a year.
The United States has much more to lose than just seeing portions of the Indo-Pacific become absorbed by
China. The loss of trust from U.S. allies alone is incredibly problematic, but expecting Chinese aggression
to stop with Taiwan—or any other ally in the region—is naive at best. While executing the recommendations
of this assessment is difficult and costly, failing to increase USAF capacity, capability, and readiness opens
a window for the Chinese to make that first move. If U.S. efforts to thwart adversary aggression are
defeated, a seismic shift in regional alliances and even the international rules-based order would ensue.
That cost is unacceptable.

Wer das Paper nicht lesen will, es gibt es auch einen Überblick über das Paper als Podcast.

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Noch eine Frage am Rande, ist es eigentlich bekannt, wie es um die Luftwaffe bei dem Thema steht?