Strategie & Taktik

[Wittgenstein]

Moderne mechanisierte Kriegsführung:

Ein wenig Geschichte:

The word blitzkrieg conjures the idea of fast tanks rolling up on the opponent with infantry following behind conducting mop up operations. But the blitzkrieg is a misleading myth that the Germans innovated a revolutionary fully mechanized approach to mobile warfare. In reality, rather than being a drastic departure from the past, German tactics and operations in World War II were an extension of the infiltration tactics that it developed to restore mobile warfare on the Western Front. German innovation in armored warfare involved mechanizing and motorizing combined-arms organization and doctrine and, as such, is synonymous with modern concepts of maneuver warfare.

The blitzkrieg myth complements another misleading narrative: that British armor innovation failed because conservative army leaders suppressed a small group of prophetic tank enthusiasts, which resulted in weak army performance on the armor-dominated battlefields of World War II. But in reality, Britain's interwar army favored reform and mechanization. Inspired by futuristic visions of mechanical warfare, the British Army relied too heavily on armor organized in tank-only brigades as the decisive arm on the battlefield

https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/47/2...tion-Harms

Das ist nur ein Artikel von vielen. Die Deutschen waren erfolgreich, weil sie nicht einen mechanisierten Ansatz wie er heute verstanden wird, verfolgten. Der "Blitzkrieg" ist mehr mit modernen Manouver Warfare Ansätzen zu vergleichen, als mit dem heute verstandenen "Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen".

Zur Moderne:
Einige Elemente erschweren den Einsatz gepanzerter Angriffe:
- Aufklärung
- Drohnen
- Artillerie
- PALR
- Minen

Beispiele:

Grozny

During the Battle of Grozny (December 1994-March 1995), with their doctrine outmoded and rusty, Russian armored and mechanized forces were initially repulsed in that capital city. They suffered heavy casualties and were forced into an operational pause. Among other things, Russian troops lacked combat readiness, and they were surprised by the unexpected resistance of the Chechens, who forced two long months of heavy fighting. Only after suffering heavy losses, the Russian army decided to change its tactics to oppose the Chechen special groups that combined anti-tank weapons, boobytraps, snipers and machinegun crews from almost every building. At that time, after losing around 225 armored vehicles (including 62 tanks) and more than 1,500 soldiers, the Russians unleashed the largest air and land attack since World War II in Grozny, producing 1,370 casualties among Chechen soldiers, with about 27,000 civilians killed

https://www.benning.army.mil/armor/eARMO...Baez22.pdf


Syrien

Turkey, however, has conducted numerous combined arms operations in northern Syria and, as such, is one of only two NATO members (the other being France in Mali) to have actually deployed large-scale mechanized and/or armored forces in combined arms operations in combat in the last decade. In Operation Euphrates Shield (OES) in the fall of 2016, the first large-scale Turkish incursion into northern Syria, Turkey demonstrated “the continued relevance of land power for achieving strategic objectives.” And while Turkey successfully achieved its limited strategic objectives in each of its subseque
The major lesson learned from OES is that tanks are vulnerable on the modern battlefield, as both Ukraine and Russia have more recently learned. Notably, Turkey lost at least eight Leopard 2A4 tanks during its 2016 incursion into Syria, and perhaps as many as twelve. Of those, Turkey lost at least five tanks to anti-tank guided missiles (a deep analysis by Bellingcat walks through each Turkish battle casualty in detail). Based on this, one analyst has described the Leopard 2A4 as “not so good armor after all.”

https://mei.edu/publications/challenges-...a-and-iraq

Ukraine

According to Zaluzhnyi, the Ukrainians need “new technologies” in order to break the stalemate. He identified the supply of air defence equipment as a priority; this should include fighter aircraft, drones, electronic warfare equipment, tools allowing counter-battery fire and equipment necessary for neutralising mines, including sapper robots.

https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/ana...ay-617-war

Libanon, Irak, Afghanistan, Balkan ... ließen sich ebenfalls als Beispiele gescheiterter/irrelevanter Panzeroperationen aufführen.
Die Gründe für das Versagen sind immer andere. Mangelnde Logistik, schlechte Ausbildung, ungünstiges Terrain, veraltete Ausrüstung, fehlende Infanterie Unterstützung.
Die Frage ist ob der enorme finanzielle, logistische und personelle Aufwand, noch im Verhältnis zum Nutzen einer großen Anzahl mechanisierter Kräfte stehen.

Fazit: Schwer gepanzerter Kräfte waren nie Kriegsentscheidend. Sie entscheiden nicht mal den Ausgang einer Schlacht.

Alternative: Die mechanisierte Kriegsführung (mit dem Primärziel Durchbruch) ist als dominierende Kriegsform des Heeres überholt. Sie war nie wirklich effektiv. Moderne TSK übergreifende Manöverkriegsführung, in welcher begrenzte schwere Kräfte eine Rolle spielen können, sind den aktuellen Bundeswehrplanungen der Schweren/Mittleren Brigaden überlegen.

Bonusvideo:

[Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tm-R5WJy...tlegrounds]

Wittgenstein - Wüstenfuchs