(Land) Merkava (MBT)

[Shahab3]

Soweit ich weiß hat die Hizbollah israelische Panzer in Nahekämpfen ausgeschaltet, das kann also doch nur dadurch geschehen sein das die Panzer aus irgend einem Grund stehen geblieben sind.

Minenfelder wurden von der Hisbollah offenbar auch ganz gerne dazu angelegt, um die anrückenden Panzer zum Ausweichen in präpariertes Terrain zu zwingen. Was eine sehr konventionelle Herangehensweise ist.
In Reichweite (auf der Ausweichroute) befanden sich dort dann die versteckten ATGM-Stellungen. Die ATGMs wurden, bei geringen Trefferquote durch Nebel und Bewegung der Panzer, in Salven abgefeuert.

Zu dem Thema gibt es eine interessante Studie vom Strategic Studies Institute:

The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy

Authored by Dr. Stephen D. Biddle, Mr. Jeffrey A. Friedman.

Verwendung von Minen:

...
The main approach route up the Saluqi valley to the Litani River was mined and overwatched by well-concealed ATGM positions, requiring the IDF to undertake deliberate assault clearance by combined arms teams of combat engineers, tanks, and artillery.85 Hezbollah defenses at Marun ar Ras were coordinated with elaborate mining of the main roadway at Junction 8; detonation of these explosives triggered the direct fire action in defense of the town on July 20.86 Some minefields south of the Litani were organized to canalize IDF vehicles into open ground within range and in view of ATGM positions north of the river.87 Yet the most extensive Hezbollah minefields could readily be bypassed, and Israeli combat engineers encountered relatively few integrated barrier defenses requiring deliberate combat clearance under fire.88 Booby traps were common, especially in and around abandoned houses, but little of the actual combat action took place through defended barrier systems, and massed indirect fires on assault forces in breaching operations were infrequent.89

Kampfentfernung:

...
The selection, layout, and concealment of fighting positions, for example, were systematically very effective. IDF attackers were rarely able to identify Hezbollah combat positions prior to drawing fire from them, even from very short ranges. In Dayr Siryan, Israeli infantry
approached to within 50-100 meters of Hezbollah fighters without spotting them; in Aytarun, tanks passed directly beneath the windows used to fire upon them without seeing the defenders first; in Bint Jubayl, defensive positions in buildings were still invisible to infantry advancing up directly adjoining streets; in At Tayyibah, Hezbollah defenders opened fire undetected
...
Antitank missile positions were especially difficult to locate, given the often extended range of ATGM engagements and Hezbollah’s success
at concealing launchers and crews (see Figure 8).128
...

Panzerbekämpfung:

...
Hezbollah frequently fired such missiles in salvos at single targets, however, and IDF armored vehicles normally maneuvered evasively and used smoke for obscuration once under attack. The result of this combination was that the ratio of ATGM hits to total launches could be very low. In the Saluqi valley fighting, missiles were fired in volleys of perhaps a dozen rounds at a time, of which 1-2 would hit their targets; an IDF combat engineering battalion in Ghanduriyih received 6-8 ATGM launches while maneuvering at night with no hits; on the night of August 12 outside At Tayyibah, a formation of more than 15 tanks received over a dozen Kornets fired from the village of Yuhmur, north of the Litani River roughly five kilometers away, suffering three hits, all of them against stationary vehicles—no moving targets were hit; in another engagement at At Tayyibah, one of a volley of four Saggers hit an IDF D9 armored bulldozer; the survivors popped smoke, but Hezbollah continued firing without further success.140 The net result was a potentially lethal threat, but a very large expenditure of missiles per target struck.141
...

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